I. A Thought Experiment: Taking the Words Seriously

Imagine taking the founding slogans of the United States at face value.

Government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed.   No taxation without representation.   Treaties are the supreme law of the land.

Now imagine applying those same rules not only to the former British colonies along the Atlantic coast, but also to the Native nations who already lived across the rest of the continent. What would that have required? What would it have made impossible?

For most Americans, the answer was never really explored. In school, the story tends to come in two tracks. On one track, we follow the high-minded drama of the founding: declarations, constitutions, debates over federalism and rights. On the other track, out at the edge of the map, we get the adventure story of “the frontier”: settlers, wagon trains, homesteads, the march westward. Native peoples tend to enter the picture as background—sometimes as noble allies, sometimes as dangerous foes, often as temporary figures who fade away once the town is built and the railroad arrives.

What almost never gets spelled out is that these two tracks are not separate stories. They are the same story seen from different angles. The question is whether the principles in the first track ever had a real chance of constraining what happened in the second. If they didn’t, then we have to ask a harder question: did the United States quietly decide, very early on, that its founding rules did not fully apply when Native nations were involved?

That question does not demand that we hate the country. It does demand that we look at its most flattering sentences and ask how far they were allowed to reach.

II. Two Logics on the Same Map

From the beginning, two logics shared the same piece of paper.

The first was the republican logic. It said that political power should rest on consent. It treated treaties as binding commitments between free parties. It claimed that arbitrary rule—governments that simply imposed themselves on people without their agreement—was a violation of natural rights. This is the logic that framed the revolution against Britain and justified breaking away from a distant king.

The second was the frontier logic. It saw the continent as a field of opportunity: land to be claimed, farms to be planted, resources to be tapped, routes to be secured. In this view, the primary questions were how to protect settlers, how to open new territory, and how to prevent rival powers from gaining a foothold. Native nations appeared in this story mostly as obstacles or temporary intermediaries on the way to permanent control.

In the early years of the republic, these two logics sometimes pretended to cooperate. The United States signed treaties with Native nations, recognized them as distinct political communities, and promised that certain lands would remain theirs. On paper, that looks like the republican logic doing its job: no rule without agreement, no acquisition without negotiation.

But whenever the two logics collided—whenever treaties and consent stood in the way of more land, more security, or faster settlement—the usual outcome was not a crisis of conscience. It was a search for a workaround. Treaties could be reinterpreted, re-ignored, or replaced. Guarantees could be “adjusted” when they became inconvenient. Military force remained in the background, and often in the foreground, as the ultimate problem-solver.

It is in those moments of collision, more than in any preamble or speech, that you see which logic truly ruled.

III. Was Coexistence Impossible, or Just Inconvenient?

At this point, a common reaction is to say: “Well, what else could have happened? Two very different civilizations were occupying the same land. Conflict was inevitable. Coexistence was unrealistic.”

There is some truth hidden in that fatalism. A genuinely equal, treaty-respecting coexistence would have been slow, messy, and constrained. It would have required acknowledging that certain lands were simply off limits to settlement, not just for a season but permanently. It would have meant treating Native nations as enduring neighbors, not as temporary wards who would eventually vanish or assimilate. It might have required limiting immigration and expansion at various points if they threatened that balance.

In other words, a serious attempt at coexistence would have imposed real costs on the growth of the United States as we know it.

But describing something as “impossible” is often a way of saying “impossible on the terms we wanted.” The terms the young republic wanted were expansive ones: rapid settlement, secure borders, and the ability of its citizens to move and claim land with relatively few restrictions. Within that framework, uncompromising respect for Native sovereignty was indeed unworkable. To fully honor earlier agreements would have meant telling would-be settlers “no” more often, and sometimes telling the federal government “no” as well.

The deeper question, then, is not whether peaceful coexistence was costless—it wasn’t—but whether abandoning it was a tragic necessity or a political decision made in favor of one set of priorities over another.

If we admit it was a decision, then we are forced to say out loud what the decision really was: when the principles of consent and treaty obligations clashed with the desire for expansion and security, the United States chose expansion and security. Not once, not twice, but as a pattern.

IV. The Quiet Constitutional Break

The United States has a formal process for changing its rules. Amendments require debate, supermajorities, and public argument. There is a paper trail when the text of the Constitution shifts.

But there is also an informal way a republic can change its rules. It can simply behave differently from what its words would suggest, consistently and over a long enough time, that the behavior becomes the new precedent. The gap between the text and the practice grows large, and yet daily life proceeds without anyone declaring that a revision has taken place.

The treatment of Native nations belongs in that second category.

On the page, treaties with Native nations were supposed to be on the same constitutional footing as treaties with European powers: part of “the supreme Law of the Land.” In practice, they were treated as temporary arrangements subject to unilateral revision whenever domestic pressure mounted. On the page, “consent of the governed” was a key justification for breaking away from Britain. In practice, Native peoples were governed by U.S. authorities without any meaningful say in whether those authorities had a right to be there at all.

This did not happen in a single dramatic moment. There was no single law titled “An Act to Suspend Our Principles on the Frontier.” Instead, there was a long sequence of decisions that all pointed the same way: removal instead of coexistence, forced dependence instead of equal-standing diplomacy, later regret instead of earlier self-restraint.

By the time most Americans learn the story in school, the quiet break has already hardened into background. Expansion appears natural. Native nations appear fragile and temporary. The earlier promises and alternatives vanish from view, and with them vanishes the understanding that a choice was made at all.

One of the consequences is that the United States can congratulate itself on its principles while quietly exempting an entire category of people from their full protection, simply by pretending that this part of the story is an unfortunate but minor footnote.

V. Why the Question Still Matters

There are many ways to talk about hypocrisy in a country’s past. Some of them are little more than exercises in self-loathing. Others are excuses to avoid thinking seriously at all: “every empire did this,” “everyone was like that back then,” and so on.

The question of how the United States handled its relationship with Native nations can be something different. It can be a strict test of whether the founding ideas were ever meant to be more than regional slogans.

If a republic claims that governments require consent, then moments when that consent is obviously absent are not side issues; they are central case studies. If it claims that treaties bind its honor, then the treaties it signed and later undermined are not obscure curiosities; they are a record of its priorities. If it claims to stand for the dignity of peoples small and large, then its behavior toward the peoples who were already here is not a distraction from the main story; it is one of the main stories.

Looking at that story with clear eyes does not mean concluding that the United States is uniquely wicked, or that nothing good has ever come from it. It does mean putting a name to the tradeoff that was made: the decision to favor rapid expansion and settler security over a stricter, more universal application of its own principles.

We live now in a country built on the results of that tradeoff. The land is mapped, the states are drawn, the reservations are where they are. We cannot rewind to a blank continent and test the other path. What we can do is decide how honest we are willing to be about which rules were bent, whom they were bent against, and why.

For some, that honesty would open difficult conversations about land, sovereignty, and responsibility. For others, it might simply mean telling the story differently to the next generation—not as an inevitable march of progress across empty space, but as a series of choices in which people already here often had little say.

A republic does not prove its strength by how often it praises itself. It proves its strength by how calmly it can look at the moments when it failed to live up to its own words, and by what it chooses to do with that knowledge. The meeting between the republic and the frontier is one of those moments. Whether we treat it as an unavoidable accident or as an honest exam of our principles says a great deal about which story we truly believe.